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MANAGING FOR EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
IN OIL SPILL RESPONSE
1.0

INTRODUCTION

Responding to oil spills, even spills of moderate proportion, requires the commitment of
substantial manpower and equipment on the part of the responsible party or the federal
government. Throughout the response operation, successful spill management entails
choosing the most effective and efficient countermeasures and cleanup techniques to
remove or neutralize oil in the environment, minimize overall environmental damages from
the spill, and insure that the objectives and expectations of government agencies,
responsible parties, and the public are met.
As the response progresses, effective and efficient management requires determining when
response operations should be terminated. In making this decision, the On-Scene
Coordinator (OSe) must deal with the complex "how clean is clean" (HCIe) issue, which
requires an often subjective determination on when a point of diminishing returns has been
reached in the cleanup effort. Beyond this point, further expenditure of resources will have
little effect on preventing damage and/or accelerating recovery, and may cause more
damage than if no further action is taken. Dealing with this issue often results in
considerable controversy among the agencies and organizations involved in the response
effort.
The purpose of this treatment is not to rigorously defme and resolve all of the processes
and issues involved in effectively and efficiently managing oil spill cleanup and dealing
with the "how clean is clean" issue. Rather, the objective is to characterize the current
strategic doctrine and practice used in dealing with these spill management issues, and
provide some insight into how this management process can be improved and supported
First of all, the overall oil spill cleanup process is reviewed, outlining the activities and
organizations involved, the participants and their roles, and the criteria for success.
Following this, the important economic and environmental concepts related to the
effectiveness, efficiency and overall success of oil spill cleanup operations are reviewed.
The importance of government policy and public perception is also discussed.
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Given this general background on oil spill response, and the factors that govern
effectiveness and efficiency, four major spill response efforts are reviewed. This review
will identify various approaches that have been used to choose effective and
environmentally sound cleanup techniques, manage the level of effort expended, and decide
when the cleanup effort should be terminated. The various approaches are summarized
noting the advantages, disadvantages, and specific applications of each.
Having characterized current doctrine and practice, a general model is proposed that can
serve as a template for planning and managing cleanup activities and resolving the "how
clean is clean" issue. The information needed to support this decision process is also
described. Finally, the various observations and conclusions are summarized, along with
specific recommendations for improving the process.

2

2.0

BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE

The study of oil spill response as a unique operations management problem began almost
thirty years ago with the TORREY CANYON spill in 1967 offthe coast of England. At
this point it became clear that major oil spills posed a significant threat to the marine
environment, and that governments and industry were experiencing great difficulty in
responding to these incidents. Since then a great deal of effort has been devoted to
developing oil spill response organizations, technologies, and doctrines to better cope with
significant and catastrophic spills. These developments are chronicled primarily in the
Proceedings of the Biannual International Oil Spill Conferences (held on odd-years 19691995), as well as in the extensive technical literature on the subject
Much attention has been given to the organizational structure and dynamics that evolve
during significant and catastrophic spills, and the strategic decisions that are made,
particularly during the initial stages of the response. Less attention has been given to the
decisions which govern effectiveness and efficiency on a day to day basis, and the
decision process used in resolving the "how clean is clean" issue.
Before proceeding further, it is important to carefully specify what is meant by
effectiveness and efficiency, as the two terms are often used interchangeably in the
literature. A clear, concise explanation of these terms is provided by Walker et al. (1994)
as follows:
Response effectiveness relates to the accomplishment of response objectives - doing

the right things (as specified by law, regulation and policy) - such as
Conducting the response safely, without injuries or deaths;
Preventing further spillage of oil;
Maximizing oil recovery;
Minimizing the environmental impact of the spill; and
Ensuring the media and public perceive the response as effective.
Response efficiency relates to the ability to use resources appropriately - doing the

right things correctly (or getting the right things done with the right amount of
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resources) - such as:
Mobilizing and using the type and number of resources appropriate for the
spill;
Attaining the sustained maximum output from available resources;
Keeping the scale of the response effort in proportion to the size of the spill
and the threat of environmental damage; and
Drawing a balance between the cost of damage mitigation and the damage
that might otherwise occur.
Near the end of the spill response effort, these last two considerations become important in
resolving the ''how clean is clean" issue and terminating the response at the appropriate
point.
Oil spill response organizations are under intense pressure to be both effective and efficient.
The pressure for effectiveness comes from those external to the oil spill response
community, such as elected officials, government administrators, the media, environmental
interest groups (non-governmental organizations) and the public at large. The pressure for
efficiency comes from within including government resource managers, oil company
management, stockholders, and marine insurance companies (Walker et. al., 1994).
Prior to the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill, there was little mention of this aspect of oil spill
response in the literature and various spill response manuals. However, during the
EXXON VALDEZ spill, effective and efficient management of oil spill cleanup operations
took on new significance and became an important issue throughout the various stages of
the response effort. This was due to the size of the spill, the complexity of the response,
and the often conflicting viewpoints held by Exxon, the Federal OSC and the State of
Alaska. The issue of "how clean Is clean" drew particular attention as it became clear that
the Coast Guard, Exxon, and the State of Alaska were faced with a seemingly open-ended
cleanup task which would ultimately require several years of effort at an enormous cost
($2.2 billion).
Subsequent to EXXON VALDEZ, the issue has surfaced in several other significant spills,
and has been dealt with using various approaches. It is becoming clear that ensuring
effective and efficient cleanup, and resolving the "how clean is clean" issue, is not a welldefined process or decision which arises at a specific point. Rather it is a complex issue
4

that evolves and must be dealt with throughout the response operation. This issue is highly
sensitive to the specific technical parameters of the spill, the interaction of the various
agencies and stakeholders managing the response effort, and the reaction and expectations
of the public at large.
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3.0

OIL SPILL CLEANUP: PROCESSES, PARTICIPANTS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

Before dealing with some of the specific issues and experience related to managing the level
of effort during spills and resolving the "how clean is clean" issue, it is useful to review oil
spill response doctrine and practice. This includes describing the decision making process,
the individuals and organizations involved and the criteria for success.
There are three major phases associated with oil spill cleanup:
Contingency Planning
Spill Response, and
Damage Assessment, Restoration and Monitoring.
Each of these three phases has an impact or provides feedback on the effectiveness and
efficiency of the oil spill cleanup effort.
The national mandate for these activities is contained in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 - OPA
90 (U.S. Congress, 1990). The procedures, participants and organizational structure for
carrying out Contingency Planning and Spill Response activities are detailed in the National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (U.S. EPA, 1994). The
National Contingency Plan (NCP) is the single most influential document governing oil
spill response in the United States. The first NCP was published in September 1968 as a
federal government interagency agreement following the TORREY CANYON spill. It was
re-published in 1970 by the Council on Environmental Quality as the first federal oil spill
response regulation. Most recently it was updated following OPA 90 to reflect the more
aggressive oil spill response requirements arising from the EXXON VALDEZ and other
major spills which occurred in 1989 and 1990.
With respect to contingency planning, the NCP itself serves as the overall contingency plan
at the national level outlining federal and state roles and responsibilities, procedures and
available resources for response. Within each Federal Region, Alaska, Oceania in the
Pacific and the Caribbean, the NCP is supplemented by a Regional Response Plan. At the
local level, where most spill response operations are focused, a detailed spill response
implementation strategy is outlined in the Area Contingency Plans (ACPs). The ACPs are
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a unique requirement of OPA 90 which recognizes that a clearer strategy and improved
tactical coordination is required at the local level to deal with major and catastrophic spills.
The ACPs tailor the implementation strategy to the resources, and the expectations and
policies of the government agencies and industry organizations in the area where the spill
occurs. In the coastal wne, these areas correspond to the area of responsibility of the
Coast Guard Captain of the Port.
These Area Contingency Plans are particularly important to the effectiveness and efficiency
of the response effort as these decisions and issues are generally tactical and site specific in
nature. It is during the contingency planning phase that the initial consensus is reached on
which tactics will be employed, what resources are available and how these resources will
be deployed and managed in the field.
The second major phase in the sequence is the spill response itself. It is during this phase
that cleanup operations are initiated and managed to recover spilled oil from the
environment and mitigate the impact of oil that cannot be removed. The NCP outlines the
specific elements of the spill response operation as follows:
Discovery and Notification:
Response agencies and organizations are alerted that a spill has occurred or
is imminent
Preliminary Assessment and Initiation of Action:
The federal On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) evaluates the magnitude and
severity of the discharge and the threat to public health and welfare or the
environment, assesses the feasibility of removal, and identifies the
potentially responsible parties.
Containment. Countermeasures. Cleanup and Disposal:
This includes defensive actions such as controlling the source and defensive
booming to protect sensitive areas, recovery or treatment of the oil to
mitigate impacts, and disposal of recovered oil and oiled debris in an
environmentally sound manner.
Documentation and Cost Recovery: This includes collecting and maintaining
documents to support cost recovery for cleanup resources utilized, as well
as for litigation and scientific purposes.
Figure 1 depicts the overall decision-making process for initiating, managing and
terminating spill response operations. At the outset of the spill, strategic decisions are
made on whether to respond or not, and the techniques and technologies that will be
employed, as depicted in the upper portion of the diagram. To some extent these decisions
7
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Figure 1. Model of the overall management and decision-making process in
oil spill response.

8

may have been pre-determined and pre-approved in the contingency planning process.
Options are narrowed and focused in the first hours and days of the spill depending on the
size, location, and environmental and economic resources threatened by the spill.
For instance, a spill of significant size that remains offshore may be dealt with using
mechanical recovery and in-situ burning. Offshore response is generally more efficient and
less environmentally damaging especially under moderate wind and wave conditions. A
spill that quickly moves onshore may require defensive booming and dispersant application
to protect sensitive areas. If the oil comes ashore, extensive shoreline cleanup may be
required to remove oil from the shore and prevent oil migration back into sensitive coastal
waters. Shoreline responses are generally less efficient and more environmentally
damaging. Thus the initial strategic decisions, which are often dictated and constrained by
the specific nature of the spill, weather conditions and location; to some extent predetermine the level of effort and effectiveness of the response.
This strategic decision-making process requires a clear understanding of the technology and
operational constraints of various countermeasures and cleanup techniques, the anticipated
environmental effects, and any policy constraints that may apply (e.g. restrictions on the
use of dispersants or in-situ burning in specific areas as per the contingency plans).
Strategic decisions are usually made in the first few hours and days of the response. This
time period has been described as the "emergency phase" by Ott, Undstedt-Siva and
Walker (1993), when decisions are focused on major options and issues. These initial
decisions are generally made in an authoritative manner by federal and state officials, and
follow guidelines outlined in regulations, contingency plans and other policy documents.
Once strategic decisions have been made and cleanup initiated, the spill response enters a
tactical phase which may typically span several weeks or months depending on the
magnitude and complexity of the response. Managing level of effort in the tactical phase
requires reaching a consensus on a day-to-day basis on which techniques should be used to
contain, treat or remove the oil from a specific location; and to what extent the technique
should be employed so that the response is effective and efficient As depicted in the
bottom portion of Figure 1, achieving effectiveness and efficiency throughout the tactical
phase requires monitoring and evaluating cleanup operations with respect to the direct
results produced (oil recovered, miles of shoreline cleaned), the secondary environmental
effects (damage caused by the cleanup operations), and the cost.
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It is during this tactical phase that the issue of "how clean is clean" is first addressed, and
ultimately becomes the primary issue in determining when the response effort should be
terminated. As operations progress during the tactical phase, the "how clean is clean"
decision (as well as others) are not likely to be clear cut and authoritative. During this
phase, described as the "overhaul phase" by Ott, Lindstedt-Siva and Walker (1993), the
decision-making process becomes more fluid often involving numerous participants and
stakeholders with differing objectives and agendas, particularly in resolving the "how clean
is clean" issue. Reaching a decision during this phase often requires diplomacy as the
needs of the various parties must be addressed and differences reconciled. Decisions are
reached more through consensus building rather than authoritative mandates by federal and
state officials. The other critical factor that enters the decision process during this phase is
the perception of the public, which will support or object to terminating cleanup operations
depending on their perception of the success or failure of the cleanup effort.
The third phase associated with spill cleanup is damage assessment, restoration and longterm monitoring. This process generally begins near the end of the response operations,
with a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA). This process attempts to quantify
the inj ury to the environment and lost use of the resources affected. OPA 90 mandated
revision of NRDA regulations specifically for oil spills. Accordingly regulations were
drafted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 1994). A
concise overview of the process is provided by Reinharz (1995). The scope, complexity
and methodologies used in Natural Resource Damage Assessment are described in detail by
Grigalunus and Opaluch (1993). Luthi et. al. (1993), and Robilliard et al. (1993).
Once damages have been evaluated and quantified, a restoration plan is formulated and
implemented to accelerate recovery of the impacted areas. Long-term monitoring of this
recovery is carried out (often for a decade or more after the spill) to study the effects of the
spill itself, the effectiveness of countermeasures and cleanup operations during the spill,
and the impact of restoration actions after the spill. It is particularly important in providing
feedback on the effectiveness of countermeasures and cleanup actions as the positive and
negative benefits of these actions may not be fully apparent at the end of the response
operations. It is also significant that even though the two activities are separated in time
and addressed under different regulations, the two are linked in that successful cleanup
should reduce natural resource damage and the need for restoration in a quantifiable
manner. Several of the NRDA models and formula recognize this by giving credit to the
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spiller for oil removal during the response (NOAA, 1994; Geselbracht and Logan, 1993).
Adding to the complexity of oil spill response operations is the variety of participants,
stakeholders and interested parties involved in the process. The response participants are
those agencies, organizations and individuals which have a direct role in the execution of
the response effort. For Federal agencies, these roles are defined under OPA 90 and the
National Contingency Plan. The roles of state agencies are specified under various state
laws, regulations and plans. The roles and responsibilities of the spiller (the responsible
party) are mandated under OPA 90.
Stakeholders can be characterized as agencies, organizations and individuals who do not
have an official role in the response effort itself, but who have a direct economic,
environmental or political vested interest in the outcome of the response effort. These
stakeholders include natural resource trustees, port authorities, shoreline property owners,
fishermen, recreational users, insurers and elected officials.
Interested parties can be described as organizations and individuals not directly involved as
responders or stakeholders, but who are concerned with the outcome. They will monitor
the situation and often bring pressure to bear on the participants if the response is perceived
as unsuccessful. In this sense they regard themselves as being stakeholders, and will often
enter the process as such. Interested parties include the media, non-governmental
environmental organizations, citizens groups and the public at large. These individuals,
agencies and organizations can facilitate or constrain the decision-making process
depending on their objectives and agendas (Mew, Rooney-Char and Webb, 1983). Table 1
summarizes various participants, stakeholders, and interested parties; their responsibilities
and agendas; and criteria for success in spill response, that is, how they view the issues of
effectiveness, efficiency and "how clean is clean".
In carrying out cleanup operations, the various participants assemble and interact within the
framework of an organizational structure or response management system which is
generally specified at a strategic level in the contingency planning process, but often
modified during the operation itself. The characteristics of these organizational structures
have been widely researched and discussed in the literature. A thorough review of the
design and dynamics of various response management systems and current practice both
nationally and internationally is provided by Walker et. al. (1994). They describe three
11

Table

1

Various agencies, organizations and parties; their responsibilities
and agendas; and criteria for success in 011 spill response.

PARTICIPANTS,
STAKEHOLDERS,AND
INTERESTED PARTIES

RESPONSIBILITY AND
AGENDA

CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

Federal On-Scene Coordinator

Meet mandates of OPA 90 and
National Contingency Plan.

Balance mitigation and
removal results and
environmental effects. Control
costs for federal response.

State On-Scene Coordinator

Meet requirements of state
regulations and contingency
plans.

Balance mitigation and
removal results and
environmental effects.

Local Officials

Represent municipalities in
ensuring natural and economic
resources within jUrisdiction
are protected and restored.
Ensure health & safety of
population.

Satisfy local public that
appropriate action is being
taken by agencies and
responsible party.

Responsible Party

Meet spiller requirements
under federal and state
regulations.

Control costs and company
liability. Preserve public image.

Resource Trustees

Protect and restore natural
resources

Remove or treat oil while
minimizing cleanup impact.
Cost is not an issue.

Insurance Companies

Meet terms of contract with
responsible party.

Cost is a paramount issue;
minimize cleanup costs and
claims.

Environmental Organizations

Represent interests of the
environement. Serve as
watchdog for agencies and
responsible party.

Protect and restore the
environement. Cost is not an
issue.

National and Local Media

Provide public with information
on spill and response effort.

Information on spill of Interest
to the general public is
provided in a timely manner.
Responding officials are
accessible to media personnel.

General Public

Voice concern for resources
Impacted, and opinion on
actions of the agencies and
responsible party.

Wants immediate action. and
clear indication that agencies
and responsible party are
resolving the problem.
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types of response management systems in detail: the traditional military command and
control system, the current U.S. National Response System as described in the NCP, and
the Incident Command System (ICS).
Current U.S. practice favors the Incident Command System (ICS) as the response
management system of choice. ICS was initiated as a response management system for
fighting forest fires and dealing with other natural disasters. The system is described in
detail by Hunter (1993). The basic structure of ICS is an incident commander supported
by interactive teams covering operations, logistics, finance and planning. The underlying
principle of ICS is that the system must have flexibility to adapt to the specific spill
scenano. Attributes that allow for this adaptation include:
Common terminology
Modular organization
Integrated communications
Unified command structure
Consolidated action plan
Manageable span of control
Pre-designated span of control
Pre-designated incident facilities, and
Comprehensive resource management.
Since EXXON VALDEZ its strengths have been recognized by the spill response
community, and it has been adapted to this function.
A primary attribute of a response management system which allows it to deal with the
issues of effectiveness, efficiency, and "how clean is clean", is the system's ability to adapt

to a changing scenario and respond to outside pressure. Walker et al. (1994) characterize
response management systems as being closed or open in this regard A closed system
is one which depends on a hierarchical structure, centralized direction, and internal
feedback; and does not interact with its technological, political, economic or socio-cultural
environments. The traditional military command and control system can be characterized as
a closed system.
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An open system relies on both external and internal feedback, distributed decision making

by small ad hoc teams, and a high degree of flexibility and innovation. Feedback from
external environments is the critical determinant in system behavior. The ICS can be
characterized as an "open system". Throughout this discussion it will become clear that an
open system is far more capable of managing for effectiveness and efficiency in oil spill
response, and dealing with the "how clean is clean" issue.
Defining success in oil spill response is a critical but somewhat elusive issue. In general
terms, success in oil spill cleanup is based on meeting the defined goals and objectives of
the response operations. Goals are the general "important results" expected in any
response operation. These are defined in strategic policy documents such as the National
Contingency Plan (NCP). The NCP specifies that response operations in the U.S. be
directed at three primary goals:
Insuring safety of human life;
Stabilizing the situation to preclude further damage;
Use of all necessary containment and removal tactics in a coordinated
manner to ensure a timely, effective response that minimizes impact to the
environment.
Achieving the first and second goal usually involves making specific decisions and
implementing them in a straightforward manner at the outset of the spill. Attaining the third
goal involves effectively dealing with a range of issues throughout the response effort
Defining success in regulations is important; but understanding how success is perceived
by the various response participants, stakeholders and interested parties is equally
important. As outlined in Table 1, each agency, organization and party will perceive
success differently. As part of their study, Walker et al. (1994) provide a summary of
perceived criteria for success for oil spill response. This summary is based on a thorough
review of the current literature, and the results of a survey conducted among federal
government agencies, federal On-Scene Coordinators, state spill response representatives,
representatives of potential responsible parties (tanker and facility owners & operators),
technical advisors and cleanup contractors. When asked the question "what constitutes a
successful response?", survey participants responded in various ways. Various attributes
of a successful response (success factors) included:
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Damage to the environment is minimized.
Public and media perceive the response as successful.
The response is expeditious.
The spread of oil is minimized.
The involved government agencies, responsible party and other participants
.
are satisfied.
The maximum possible amount of oil is removed.
There is multi-party synergism.
There are no injuries or fatalities.
Cost are controlled.
A response organization is established and maintains command and
controL
Proper and least disruptive (environmentally) cleanup techniques are
employed.
There is appropriate restoration of the environment
Clearly different individuals judge the success of the response operation by different
criteria It is also interesting that some of the criteria are not directly related to the
effectiveness and efficiency of the cleanup effort.
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4.0

ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCEPTS RELATED TO
EFFECTIVENESS AND KF:FICIENCY

In understanding how the spill response effort can be managed to ensure effectiveness and
efficiency, it is necessary to understand certain economic and environmental concepts.
In a strictly economic sense, successfully managing a spill response can be described as
balancing the benefit derived vs. the cost of the cleanup operations. In terms of economic
theory, a business will produce a good or service (expend effort) until a point is reached
where the marginal cost (cost of producing the next unit of product or service) equals the
marginal revenue (the financial return from that unit). At this point profit is maximized;
beyond this point profit diminishes.
To extend this concept to oil spill cleanup, one should ideally expend additional effort in
cleaning up a spill until the point is reached where the marginal cleanup cost (cost of
removing or neutralizing the next unit of oil) equals the marginal cleanup benefit (the dollar
value of the natural resource damage prevented by removing that next unit of oil). Beyond
this point, it would be less expensive to restore the resource or provide compensation for
the damages.
Figure 2 shows how these two parameters might be expected to vary as a function of the
barrels of oil recovered or treated (as with dispersants or in-situ burning). Ideally, the
response effort would be terminated at the point where the two curves intersect, that is,
when marginal cleanup cost begins to exceed marginal cleanup benefit In practice, values
for marginal cleanup cost and marginal cleanup benefit are difficult to determine or even
estimate. Marginal cleanup cost accounting is possible but requires significant effort.
Marginal cleanup benefit is very difficult to quantify as it requires affixing dollar values to
environmental resources, and determining the degree to which the cleanup effort reduces
the cost of natural resource damage. As evidenced by the Natural Resource Damage
Assessment (NRDA) process, such estimates are imprecise and subject to much
interpretation and controversy (Grigalunus and Opaluch, 1993; Bennett, Peacock and
Goodspeed, 1995). It is also unlikely that a response effort would be terminated exactly at
the point where the two curves intersect, as current laws and regulations treat removal and
restoration as separate issues. Agency policy and public opinion will generally require
cleanup to a point where further effort is clearly impractical or environmentally damaging.
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Marginal Cleanup Cost vs.
Marginal Cleanup Benefit

","-- Marginal Cleanup Benefit

.-.-- Marginal
Cleanup
Cost
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Cleanup·
Benefit
BBL Recovered or Treated

Figure 2. Diagram showing the relationship between marginal cleanup cost
and marginal cleanup benefit.
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This may be well beyond the point where marginal cleanup cost exceeds marginal cleanup
benefit.
Along with economic considerations, proper spill management requires understanding the
environmental considerations. The tradeoff between the damage caused by oil left in the
environment versus damage caused by attempts to mitigate it has long been recognized as a
critical issue. Cleanup impacts can be severe as encountered in the TORREY CANYON
response where the use of toxic dispersants to remove oil from the shoreline severely
retarded recovery of the shoreline ecosystem. More recently, hot water washing of the
shoreline following the EXXON VALDEZ spill was found to be more detrimental to
shoreline ecosystem recovery than leaving the oil in place for natural removal, although hot
water washing may have prevented ongoing reentry of oil into the adjacent waters (Mearns,
1993). Accordingly, recent cleanup technology development efforts are focusing on less
intrusive, more environmentally benign methods of removing or neutralizing oil in the
environment, such as bioremediation for shorelines and less toxic dispersants for open
water treatment of spills. In attempting to balance the environmental impacts of the oil with
the environmental impacts of various countermeasures and cleanup actions, the important
concept is that of Net Environmental Benefit (NEB).
Undertaking countermeasures and cleanup actions can have a range of possible outcomes
as illustrated in Figure 3. The vertical axis corresponds to the environmental value
provided or integrity of the resources affected by the spill, the horizontal axis corresponds
to time after the spill. Curve A represents the baseline case where a spill occurs and no
cleanup is attempted. As always, the spill results in resource degradation, but after some
period of time the environmental value/integrity returns to its original state (as is usually the
case). Curve B is typical of the case where an environmentally benign countermeasure has
been implemented (e.g. offshore mechanical recovery or in-situ burning), such that the
resource is spared the full impact of the spill and recovery is accelerated. Curve C
represents an optimum scenario for shoreline cleanup where the cleanup operations cause
some additional disruption and damage to the ecosystem, but recovery is accelerated over
the long-run. Curve D represents a worst case scenario where an aggressive,
environmentally intrusive response effort is implemented such that significant additional
damage occurs, and recovery is actually retarded.
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The "net environmental benefit" of the response activities is the measure of prevented
environmental damage relative to the baseline case. Another way of describing the net
environmental benefit is the acceleration in time of the recovery process as compared to the
baseline case (as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4). It can also be depicted by the shaded area
in Figure 4 which represents the net damage prevented by initiating the cleanup.
An extensive treatment of the impact of shoreline cleanup operations, focused on the net
environmental benefit issue is provided in a report by AURIS Ltd. (1994). The results of
the study are summarized by Sell et. al. (1995). After a thorough review of the outcome of
past shoreline cleanup operations, the report concluded that the recovery time for various
ecosystems was three to five years. It also concluded that this recovery time was often
independent of whether shoreline cleanup had been attempted or not. The report further
recommended that from an environmental standpoint, shoreline cleanup should be pursued
only when it can be expected to significantly accelerate recovery, that is, promote recovery
in less than 3 to 5 years. Of course, little is known on the capability of specific techniques
and technologies to accelerate recovery, and how this accelerated recovery varies with
different shoreline types.
In economic terms, achieving a net environmental benefit in spill response means that the
cleanup activities result in a net decrease in the dollar value of the aggregate natural resource
damage (NDR) caused by the spill. The aggregate NRD is the sum of the NRD due to the
oil itself and NRD caused by the cleanup. This is illustrated in Figure 5 originally presented
by Dunford, Hudson, and Desvouges (1991). The optimum level of effort from an
environmental standpoint is reached when the aggregate NRD is minimized. This does not
include soci<reconomic considerations (such as total removal from areas of high public use
such as bathing beaches) which may require expenditure of cleanup effort well beyond the
optimum point described above.
In practice, the precise quantification of economic and environmental costs and benefits and
the determination of efficiency endpoints will be difficult. However, these concepts should
be kept in mind, and overall trends in efficiency recognized so that the cleanup effort does
not proceed beyond some reasonable level, as is sometimes the case in addressing other
environmental cleanup projects. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer refers to this
problem as "tunnel vision", that is, when the single-minded pursuit of a single goal carries
an endeavor to a point where it brings more harm than good (Breyer, 1993). This often
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Relation Between Natural Resource Damages (NRD)
and Cleanup Activities
(Dunford, Hudson, DesvQusges, 1991)
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Figure 5. Diagram showing the relation between natural resource damages
(NRD) and cleanup activities.
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results in expending the majority of the funding on solving "the last ten percent" of the
problem.
Although it is difficult to quantitatively monitor the parameters described above, it is
certainly both possible and beneficial to keep track of overall cleanup progress vs. cleanup
cost. This can be most easily monitored during the response by tracking tangible results
(the barrels of oil recovered or miles of shoreline treated), and computing the unit cost of
barrel removed or mile treated. A simple method of computing unit cost is to divide the
total recorded or anticipated cost by the total barrels recovered or total miles of shoreline
treated. A more precise and useful figure in gauging effectiveness and efficiency over time,
and addressing the "how clean is clean" at a specific point in time, is the "current unit cost".
This can be derived by dividing the costs incurred during a specific time period (week or
day), by the barrels recovered/miles of shoreline treated during that specific week or day.
Figure 6 shows how daily cost, total cost, and unit cost may be expected to vary as the
response progresses. Daily costs usually start at a moderate level and then escalate as more
equipment and personnel are brought on-scene. As operations peak, so does the daily cost.
As the response effort matures and operations decline, daily costs decline and the total cost
approaches a certain level. Unit costs can be expected to increase as more effort and funds
are expended in recovering each additional unit of oil and cleaning each additional mile of
shoreline.
Figure 7 shows a typical comparison between tangible results (barrels recovered/miles of
shoreline treated) and the unit cost of cleanup (either average or current). The exact shape
of the curves and values reached will vary from spill to spill. The curves presented are
typical of a major spill response such as during the EXXON VALDEZ and AMERICAN
TRADER spills (Noerager and Goodman, 1991; Carpenter, Dragnich and Smith, 1991;
Card and Meehan, 1991). The number of miles of shoreline "treated" will also vary
significantly from spill to spill based on the criteria for "adequate treatment" or "how clean
is clean". However, one can expect that as the response continues, total barrels recovered
and miles of shoreline will approach a specific value, while unit cleanup costs will begin to
escalate significantly (perhaps exponentially). It is useful to record these values, as is now
being done during various major spills, and plot them to so that trends can be recognized
and understood, and the point of diminishing return can be identified.
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Cleanup Costs During Response Effort
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Tracking Direct Results vs.
Cost During Cleanup Effort
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5.0

THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY AND PERCEPTION

The fmal consideration in determining appropriate level of effort and resolving the "how
clean is clean" issue is regulatory policy, and public perception and opinion. Both factors

are often intermingled and may subjectively impact cleanup activities. Regulatory policy on
the appropriate level of effort is often stated in very general tenns and expressed as overall
spill response "goals" as discussed above. This policy generally evolves in the course of a
specific response as goals are translated into specific strategic and tactical objectives and
action plans.
Accordingly, policy guidelines remain somewhat descriptive and vague. The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 requires that the President, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) and Area Contingency Plan (ACP), ensure "effective and immediate" removal of a
discharge (Sec. 4201, OPA 1990). In addressing the removal responsibilities of
responsible parties, Section 4202 requires removal of a worst case discharge to "the
maximum extent practicable". In implementing OPA 90, the revised National Contingency
Plan leaves detennining the appropriate level of effort in cleanup to the discretion of the
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) in consultation with other response agencies and the natural
resource trustees. Response tennination is determined by the OSC in consultation with the
Governor or Governors of the affected states.
Although the revised NCP does not provide specific criteria, it does recognize the need for
specific information to properly address the net environmental benefit issue. Specifically,
Section 4.1.4 of Appendix E of the NCP calls for the development of a Fish and Wildlife
and Sensitive Environments Plan Annex to Area Contingency Plan (EPA, 1994). This
Annex provides technical guidance on the environmental effects of various
countenneasures and cleanup techniques. The Annex is designed to "identify potential
environmental effects on fish and wildlife, their habitats, and other sensitive environments
resulting from removal actions or countermeasures including the option of "no removal".
The Annex should also "establish priorities for application of countermeasures and removal
actions to habitats within the geographic region of the ACP". Given these provisions in the
ACP, it appears that decision-making on level of effort and "how clean is clean" is being
appropriately left up to the OSC in consultation with other participants and stakeholders at
the local level.
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In managing spill response efforts in the coastal rone, Coast Guard OSCs follow the
generic guidelines provided by the Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual (USCG, 1995).
The current version of this manual states that removal is "complete" when:
no oil is detectable in the water or on adjoining shorelines; or
further removal causes more environmental harm than good; or
cleanup is excessively costly in view of risk prevented; and
activities required to repair unavoidable damage resulting from removal
actions have been performed.

The Marine Safety Manual also provides general guidance on ensuring efficiency. In
managing a federally funded response, that is one in which the Coast Guard is actively
managing the cleanup, the OSC is directed to:
minimize the elapsed time from notification to equipment deployment,
match equipment and personnel to spill characteristics,
minimize the cost of labor equipment and materials, and
rapidly secure (demobilize) those resources no longer needed.

As in the NCP, the "how clean is clean" decision is left to the OSC based on the set of
"common sense" principles outlined above. Although this provides discretion and
flexibility in reaching the decision, it may complicate the decision-making process when the

OSC is subjected to differing views and agendas by the other response agencies and
resource trustees, which are often influenced by public reaction and pressure.
Public perception and expectations are often critical factors in determining the dynamics and
agendas for interaction between the various response agencies and resource trustees. As
with other issues in our society, perception is often more powerful than reality, and in fact
becomes reality in the context of the specific issue or event Oil spills are highly visible
events which generate intense public concern further stimulated by the media and special
interest groups. Consequently, the perceived impact of an oil spill may have little relation
to the actual long-term biochemical and physical impacts on the resources, but may be
extremely important in influencing how the response effort is managed. Although oil spills
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are relatively short-lived events and other environmental insults may be far more damaging
in the long tenn, this overall environmental perspective is easily overshadowed by the
public's emotional reactions (Ott, Lindstedt-Siva, and Walker, 1993).
Even more important to the management of the spill than the perceived impact is the
perceived adequacy of the response efforts. If the public perceives that an effective
response effort is being mounted and that the authorities are in control of the situation, they
are less likely to pressure the various legislators and agencies and influence the
management of the response. On the other hand, if the response efforts are perceived as
inadequate and uncoordinated, and agency officials are perceived as confused and not in
control, public pressure will be brought to bear often without understanding the true
scientific, technological and operational constraints. Such perceptions may persist
throughout the spill despite actual progress and ultimately complicate the "how clean is
clean" determination. There will be a continued reluctance particularly on the part of local
and state agencies, and resource trustees to sign off on a response effort that is perceived as
an overall failure.
The key to managing public opinion and pressure is the accurate and timely dissemination
of information by a central source. Care must be taken not to exaggerate the potential
damages, or inflate expectations on the ability to respond. In a crisis, the two biggest
problems faced by an organization are the loss of public confidence and the fear of the
unexpected by groups affected by the event (Meidt, 1991). From the point of view of the
OSC, the key to dealing with public perceptions in crisis relates to the ability to coordinate
the infonnation flow within the response organization, focus the information being
imparted, and provide this information to the media in a timely fashion.
In summary, successfully managing level of effort during oil spill cleanup requires
sufficient information on both the progress and expenditures in cleanup effort and the
associated environmental effects. Tradeoffs must be made based on both the qualitative
and quantitative data available, the current policy as specified in the regulations and
guidelines, and the expectations and perceptions of the stakeholders and other interested
parties. The overall goal is to foster an infonned consensus decision-making process that
optimizes effectiveness and efficiency throughout the spill; and leads to resolution of the
"how clean is clean" issue, and a smooth termination of the response.
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6.0

APPROACHES ADOPTED DURING RECENT MAJOR SPILLS

The discussion above outlines some of the key concepts and critical factors in managing
level of effort and resolving the "how clean is clean" issue. Although regulations and
agency guidelines provide some general criteria in addressing these decisions, the specific
criteria and procedures are left to the discretion of the spill responders. Accordingly
various approaches to dealing with these issues have evolved during recent majors spills.
The following analysis looks at four such spills: the EXXON VALDEZ spill in Prince
William Sound, Alaska in 1989, the AMERICAN TRADER spill in Long Beach,
California in 1990, the Tampa Bay in 1993 in Florida (which involved three vessels), and
the MORRIS J. BERMAN spill in San Juan, Puerto Rico in 1993.

EXXON VALDEZ Spill in Prince William Sound
On March 24, 1989, the EXXON VALDEZ ran aground in Prince William Sound spilling
approximately 11 million gallons (262,000 barrels) of Prudhoe Bay Crude. The oil would
eventually impact 1,100 mile of coastline in Alaska, making it the largest and most
environmentally damaging spill in U.S. history. At the height of the response, more than
11,000 personnel and 1,400 vessels were involved in the cleanup effort (NOAA, 1992).
The response effort is documented in detail in the Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report
(USCG, 1993). Figure 8 shows the initial location and movement of the spill, and the
large area ultimately affected.
The EXXON VALDEZ spill was immediately described as "a catastrophic oil
spill". Walker et. al. (1994) describe such spills as
"those rare events which involve a release on the order of millions of gallons of oil
into the marine environment in a location and under such circumstances that
economic, environmental, political, social and cultural impacts result"
These spills generally constitute a Tier 3 spill as defined by the International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) in that "substantial resources
will be required and support from national and international cooperative stockpiles will be
necessary" (IPIECA, 1991). As such, catastrophic spills represent "worst case"
occurrences.
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Figure 8. Map showing the location and advance of oil from the EXXON
VALDEZ oil spill (from USCG, 1993).
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On a strategic level, the EXXON VALDEZ spill represents a case where the success of the
response effort was heavily constrained by the spill scenario, and to a large extent predetermined by the key events during the initial days of the response. The primary
determining factor in the response effort was the enormous quantity of oil released. In
touring the spill area on March 26, the Governor of Alaska remarked
"We simply don't have enough equipment to contain it. No one does. You
couldn't contain it with all of the equipment in Alaska" (USCG, 1993).
The second determining factor was the weather. Initial conditions were suitable for several
offshore countermeasures and cleanup techniques including mechanical recovery,
dispersants, and in-situ burning. However, within four days of the spill, a major storm
had precluded effective implementation of these techniques by dispersing the slick over a
wide area, driving much of the oil ashore, and emulsifying the oil that remained in open
water which made dispersants and in-situ burning infeasible. Given this limited "window
of opportunity", it was estimated that only 20% to 25% of the oil could have been
recovered, even if all equipment in the U.S. inventory could have been marshaled and had
worked perfectly (USCG, 1993).
The initial response was also complicated by difficulties in reaching strategic decisions on
the use of dispersants. Although dispersants had been pre-approved for a large area within
Prince William Sound, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) was
reluctant to approve their use without extensive preliminary testing. This reluctance was
based on concern for longer term impact of the dispersed oil on fisheries and other marine
resources in Prince William Sound Although the testing of dispersants continued into
April, ADEC never approved full-fledged use until the window of opportunity had passed.
Likewise, in-situ burning was employed but only as a test (Allen, 1991). On March 25, a
highly successful test bum was conducted in which 15,000 gallons of oil were removed
from the water. On March 26 the results of these tests were reviewed and a decision to
proceed with in-situ burning on large scale was made. Unfortunately, the in-situ bum
option had to be abandoned because of an approaching storm forced cleanup crews to take
shelter, and ultimately emulsified the oil, rendering it unburnable.
Containment and mechanical recovery operations were initiated within hours of the spill.
Containment booming of the fish hatcheries in Prince William Sound was successfully
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accomplished at several locations. Mechanical recovery met with reasonable success but
was limited by the amount of equipment available on-scene and the logistics of moving
additional equipment into Prince William Sound (Noerager and Goodman, 1991; Harrison,
1991).
In reality, aggressive implementation of all cleanup techniques within hours after the spill
would not have removed significant amounts of oil from the environment. Even though
•
additional supplies of dispersants were ultimately delivered to Valdez, these would have
treated only 10% ofthe oil at best (USCG, 1993). In-situ burning equipment was available
but only in limited quantities such that only a fraction of the oil might have been burned.
Consequently, the slowness of the decision-making process did not, in itself, significantly
impact the overall result of the response effort. However, it did contribute to a growing
public perception that the response effort was slow and poorly coordinated, and plagued by
a lack of consensus among the federal and state agencies, and the Exxon oil company.
Although offshore cleanup operations continued on a limited scale throughout the summer
of 1989, the bulk of the response effort quickly centered on a labor intensive, costly
shoreline cleanup effort. In the end, the cleanup operation would span three years and cost
in excess of $2 billion.
Throughout the shoreline cleanup process, several alternatives were investigated including
the use of cold and hot pressure washing, the use of surfactant chemicals in washing the oil
from the beaches, and the use of bioremediation to accelerate natural degradation of the oil.
An elaborate mechanical removal and cleaning technique was also proposed during the
summer of 1990. The On-Scene Coordinator's report thoroughly documents how each of
these techniques was tested and evaluated during the spill itself, often under stringent
protocols that seemed more suitable to the laboratory than field decision-making. This was
often done in response to differing opinions and agendas among the various participants
and stakeholders on the effectiveness of pressure washing, chemical washing and
bioremdiation.
As a result of these differing opinions, a compromise was reached which favored cold
water pressure washing, and later hot water pressure washing. Although there was
ongoing concern over the secondary effects of hot water, high pressure cleaning, it soon
became the preferred technique largely because of the perceived need to produce visible
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cleanup results. Follow-up long-term monitoring has since shown that the natural cleaning
process (let nature take its course) would have been an effective, more environmentally
benign option in removing oil from both exposed and sheltered beaches. Monitoring has
shown that beaches treated with hot water flushing took longer to recover compared to
other beaches which were left alone (NOAA, 1992; Mearns, 1993).
Controversy over cleanup techniques and technologies continued as the response
progressed. Chemical surfactants were favored by Exxon to enhance pressure washing,
but discouraged by EPA based on general concern over the toxicity and effectiveness of
such agents. Conversely, both the EPA and Exxon favored bioremediation, and undertook
a major study to investigate its use in Prince William Sound. This was in contrast to the
State of Alaska which was less than enthusiastic about the technique, viewing it as
somewhat of a last resort or "polishing technique", only to be applied when all other
techniques had been tried. During the second year of the response, a complex technology
was proposed which would physically remove material from the beaches, clean it, and
return it to the shore. This removal and cleaning process, which came to be termed the
"rock washer", was touted by ADEC but opposed by the federal government and Exxon.
In determining which techniques were appropriate, the desired level of effort, and when
cleanup efforts were sufficient, a number of approaches evolved. During much of the
shoreline cleanup effort, these issues were resolved by what can best be described as a
"general consensus approach" whereby cleanup techniques were selected and implemented
through consultation among the major participants and stakeholders. In addressing the
"how clean is clean" issue, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (pOSe) terminated cleanup
efforts on a particular segment of beach when it was judged clean enough based on the
qualitative assessment and a general consensus by a group of experts.
This group of experts evolved along with the spill response effort itself, starting as a team
of ad-hoc work groups with representation from the major response participants (e.g.
Coast Guard, EPA, NOAA, State of Alaska, Exxon) and various stakeholders (resource
trustees and non-governmental organizations). On March 30, 1989 three such work
groups were formed, one to rank affected areas for cleanup priority, a second to identify
cleanup techniques, and a third to make final assessments of the cleanup performed. These
work groups came to be identified as the "Shoreline Assessment/Cleanup Assessment
Team". As the complexity of the cleanup increased, and the shoreline cleanup spread
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outside of Prince William Sound, formal Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committees
(ISCC) were established which combined the functions of the various shoreline cleanup
work groups which had been created immediately following the spill. An ISCC was
established for each of the four major response zones (Prince William Sound, Seward,
Homer, and Kodiak), which were sub-sections of the affected coastline in Southern Alaska
designated to facilitate management of the extensive cleanup operation (see Figure 8).
The shoreline cleanup decision-making process followed by the ISCC is shown in Figure 9
as described by Teal (1991). Within each of the four major areas, cleanup priorities were
established based on the overall environmental, economic, and historic/cultural sensitivity
of each segment. Cleanup efforts were focused on anadramous fish streams, spawning
areas, fish hatcheries, commercial fishing areas, subsistence fishing and hunting areas,
marine mammal haulout and pupping areas, and archaeological sites. On-site evaluations
were conducted by the Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Teams (SCAT), organized by Exxon
to conduct detailed shoreline surveys. Each SCAT consisted of a marine ecologist, an
archaeologist, and a geomorphologist. The function of these teams was to:
Evaluate on-site treatment priorities,
Develop treatment recommendations,
Implement shoreline treatment when called for, and
Evaluate post treatment conditions.
Based on the site assessment and recommendations of the SCAT, a work plan was
prepared by Exxon. It was then reviewed by the Alaska State Historic Preservation Office
(SHPO) and forwarded to the FOSC. The FOSC forwarded the work plan to the ISCC for
follow-up review. The ISCC met daily to review the shoreline data that was collected, the
proposed work plans, and the resource constraints outlined by Exxon.
Overall, the SCAT/ISCC decision process proved very effective. In a later evaluation of
the ISCC's role by several of its principal members, it was determined that
"the combination of daily interaction, broadly based and early agency and nongovernmental involvement, and reference to a common information base
contributed to the streamlining of decision making at a time when expeditious
decision making was essential" (USCG, 1993).

34

1)

2)
Definition of
priority (sensitivities)
areas

Interagency Shoreline

Planning

....

Cleanup Committee
(ISCC)

f

3)

Field surveys
by Exxon
Shoreline Cleanup
Assessment Teams
SCA
5)

4)

Cleanup
recommendations
and work plan
prepared by Exxon

6)

..

...

•

Recommendation
submitted to
Federal On Scsne
Coordinator
IFOSC)

Review by State
Historical Preservations
Officer
(SHPO)

7)

..

Advice

....

ISCC

8)

.
Implementation
of work plan

Figure 9. Diagram showing the shoreline cleanup decision process
followed by the Intera~ency Shoreline Cleanup Committee during
the summer of 1989 EXXON VALDEZ cleanup effort
(from Teal, 1991).
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The shoreline decision-making process became more tactical in nature in the summer of
1990 as the cleanup focused on the more heavily oiled areas. The process was modified to
be more expeditious and site-specific. While overall cooperation had developed among the
involved agencies during the previous winter, specific differences often arose on the best
cleanup approach and level of effort needed for each segment, which had to be ironed out
quickly on a case by case basis. To achieve his, the work plan review process was
incorporated into the work plan development, such that the process became more vertically
integrated as shown in Figure 10.
The "working through" process in the summer of 1990 was largely accomplished by a
newly formed FOSC advisory committee, the Technical Assessment Group (TAG). This
group consisted of representatives from the Coast Guard, NOAA, ADEC and Exxon. The
TAG was smaller and could develop consensus recommendations and provide them to the
FOSC more quickly than the ISCC which it replaced. However, it did not involve the
participation of the non-governmental organizations, and its meetings were not open to the
press and general public as was the case with the ISCC meetings. This understandably left
some stakeholders and interested parties (e.g. The Sierra Club) feeling that they had been
cut out of the decision process (USCG, 1993). This led to accusations that the TAG
violated the State of Alaska's "sunshine laws" and spurred additional controversy over the
cleanup effort and its outcome.
Under the new process, recommendations on environmental priorities and constraints were
formulated by a Resource Advisory Group (RAG), which included stakeholder
representation as had the ISCC. These were combined with recommendations on shoreline
cleanup technologies by the Shoreline Assessment Team to produce site-specific cleanup
recommendations for TAG consideration. The TAG would then consult with the SHPO
regarding impact on archaeological and cultural resources, and land managers for natural
resource impact. The TAG would then either make a no treatment recommendation (NTR)
or pass a specific plan for treatment on to the FOSC for approval.
Because of land manager concerns, a process evolved that gave land managers two
opportunities to provide input. The first occurred during the formulation of the plan as
described above when the TAG requested review from the State Technical Advisory
Group, a parallel group which included land managers, before making its initial
recommendations to the FOSe. The second occurred when the recommendations were
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fOlWarded to the FOSC, such that land managers were given an additional 24 hours to
provide additional input.
Once the work plan was approved by the FOSC, it was implemented by Exxon, with the
results monitored by the Coast Guard and NOAA. As the cleanup operations on a
particular segment neared completion, the final "how clean is clean" assessment was made
by Coast Guard, NOAA and ADEC representatives, and a final sign-off or continued
cleanup recommendation made to the FOSC.
The general consensus approach embodied in the ISCCrrAG process was driven to some
extent by the subjectivity of "how clean is clean" issue, the lack of specific policy on the
issue (as discussed above), and the overall complexity of the situation. It was further
driven by the range of agendas and opinions held by the entities involved in the decision
process, and the need for a system flexible enough to deal with the varied shoreline types
on a segment-by-segment basis. Despite these complicating factors, the "general
consensus" approach proved robust enough to support the decision process in most cases.
The members of the ISCC and later TAG were able to reach a consensus on when each
segment was clean enough, such that response operations could be gradually scaled back.
In addition to the general consensus approach, two additional, more structured approaches
were proposed during the cleanup effort During the summer of 1990, a "quantitative
analytical approach" was proposed by the State of Alaska. This approach was proposed to
determine when physical removal of oil from the shoreline had proceeded far enough to
warrant follow-up application of bioremediation agents to the shoreline. The standard
proposed was that physical removal had to proceed until an equivalent oil residue
concentration of5 g1kg in the sediments was achieved (USCG, 1993). This standard was
based on the assumption that the biodegradation rate with the treatment was on the order of

5 g1kg per year, such that all remaining hydrocarbons would be removed within a year.
As described in the Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report (USCG, 1993), this numeric
standard caused considerable controversy between ADEC, Coast Guard, NOAA and
Exxon. Exxon characterized the state's proposal as "illogical and technically flawed", and
maintained that the use of quantitative criteria to specify cleanup techniques would be
disruptive to field operations. NOAA asserted that "Achievement of such a standard
would be difficult to measure, excessively time consuming, and subject to a wide range of
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possible errors". The Coast Guard FOSC adopted the position held by Exxon and NOAA.
Although the proposal was never formally withdrawn by the State of Alaska, it was never
formally adopted either, and the TAG continued to make shoreline cleanup decisions based
on the "general consensus approach" (USCG, 1993).
Another approach used in the course of the Exxon Valdez was the formal "Net
Environmental Benefit Analysis" approach or NEBA. This approach was used in
evaluating the viability of the so-called "rock washer" project, proposed by the State of
Alaska during the 1990 cleanup effort. The net environmental benefit concept had been
recommended by Exxon as the guiding principal for 1990 cleanup efforts.
The "rock washing" apparatus envisioned was a large, barge-mounted processing plant that
removed beach material from the shoreline, transported it to the barge via conveyor belt,
cleaned it, and returned it to the beach. From the outset the rock washer appeared to be a
fonnidable engineering effort, as well as being environmentally intrusive. The FOSC
requested that NOAA conduct a detailed NEBA study to compare the benefits of excavation
and rock washing with the benefits of natural cleanup. The study sought to identify criteria
and sites where operation of the "rock washer" would produce a net environmental benefit.
The NEBA study concluded that a net environmental benefit would be achieved only in
isolated cases. Disagreement immediately ensued between Exxon and the State of Alaska
over the study conclusions (USCG, 1993). NOAA reasserted its position stating that there
was "no net environmental benefit to be gained by shoreline excavation and washing" and
that "this technology has the potential of aggravating the injury to the environment caused
by the spill" (NOAA, 1989). Based on NOAA's recommendation, the FOSC did not
authorize the project
The NEBA approach stands out as the most comprehensive and well-documented process
for reaching a decision on the appropriateness of a specific technology, and the level of
effort required for implementation. However, it should be noted that the approach was
time consuming (it took several weeks), and required collection of substantial quantities of
engineering and scientific data. In the EXXON VALDEZ spill, this time was available as
the response had evolved into a protracted cleanup effort (lasting years), and much of the
required scientific knowledge had been acquired during the course of the response effort.

In other major spill response efforts, this is not likely to be the case.
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The EXXON VALDEZ spill was significant in that it once again demonstrated the
difficulties encountered in dealing with catastrophic oil spills, and the need to upgrade the
nation's capability to respond to such spills. The spill was pivotal in spurring public
opinion and Congressional action which resulted in the passage of national oil spill
legislation in OPA 90. The magnitude and complexity of the spill required far more
coordination and more complex decision making than previous major spills. The length of
the cleanup effort, the number and sensitivity of the natural resources impacted, and the
enormous cost of the effort required a far more deliberate and organized approach to
managing for effectiveness and efficiency, and resolving the "how clean is clean" issue.
The debate on the effectiveness and efficiency of the EXXON VALDEZ cleanup effort
continues. Lloyds of London, and affiliated marine insurance companies, have entered into
litigation with Exxon, refusing to pay much of the cleanup costs associated with the spill.
Lloyd's contention is that the cleanup effort was excessively costly and not directed at
mitigating environmental damage, but rather controlling adverse public reaction to the spill
(National Underwriter, 1993; New London Day, 1995). As the costs were not justified on
the basis of "appropriate cleanup actions", the insurers maintain that the expenses are not
covered. Regardless of the ultimate judgment in the case, it is likely that future cleanup
expenditures will be more closely scrutinized on the basis of effectiveness and efficiency.
AMERICAN TRADER Spill off Huntington Beach
On February 7, 1990 the oil tanker AMERICAN TRADER grounded on one of her own
anchors off Huntington Beach, California spilling 400,000 gallons (9,500 barrels) of
North Slope crude which ultimately impacted 14 miles of recreational beach along Southern
California's populated coast. The location and area impacted by the spill are shown in
Figure 11. As such, the AMERICAN TRADER spill constituted a "significant spill" which
usually involves a discharge of a medium to major volume (10,000 -100,000 gallons in a
coastal area), which has the potential for causing substantial environmental and economic
impact and a high level of outside interest. As with catastrophic spills, response to
"significant spills generally requires additional personnel, cleanup equipment and other
resources beyond what is available in the immediate area (Walker et. al., 1994).

40

American Trader Oil Spill Overflight Observations
33° 50'

Platfonn: Jet Ranger
Date, Time: 2/12/90, 0745-0975
Observers: Reilly (NOAA), Johnso and
Carlson (State Lands Commission)

On-scene weather obsuvalloo:
Winds 6-8 knots.
Overflight Altitude: 100-250 fL

Modcnlo beach imp&CII were ICCII
bctwca> Boba Chic. aJ>d

Hualingwn BCACh Pia. Lialll
1m~1I Soulb..ud 10 1
mil, N or lhc N,wport BCACb pier.

SbORlia,

33° 40'

........
... .. . . .
Relative Thickness·
Sheen

r::::::J

Medium I:,:(.::;:/il

Heavy

33° 30'

1:':"':':':1
:l::!::.:::

·Map only indicates relative position
and thickness of oil. Total amount of
oil seen decreases each day due to
natural weathering and dispersion
pro,cesses. Typ,ically, "medium" today
IS lighter than 'medium" yeslerday.

118° 20'

118° 10'

117° 50'

Figure 11. Map showing the general location and coastal area impacted by
the AMERICAN TRADER oil spill (from MSO LA/LB, 1991).
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The response to the spill was immediate, well-organized and effective due largely to
favorable weather, the availability of oil spill recovery equipment, good strategic planning,
and cooperation between the responsible party and federal government (Rolan and
Cameron, 1991; Card and Meehan, 1991; MSO LAlLB, 1991). An offshore response was
mounted in the first few days following the spill employing 15 major skimming systems
and 25 support vessels which resulted in recovery of 25% of the spilled oil (an optimum
percentage for mechanical recovery). Beach cleanup involved the mechanical removal of
oil sludge by 1,300 workers. Heavy equipment was minimized in an effort to reduce
shoreline damage. In all, the cleanup proceeded in textbook fashion employing proven
technologies such that the spill response was completed by April 3.
Unlike EXXON VALDEZ, the first few days of the AMERICAN TRADER response were
marked by rapid mobilization of the spill response organization, and decisive action on the
choice of various countermeasures and cleanup strategies. The rapid formation of the
response structure can be attributed to the extensive contingency planning on the part of the
federal agencies and the responsible party (British Petroleum), prompted largely by the
lessons learned in during the EXXON VALDEZ spill. This contingency planning included
adopting the Incident Command System response management system, which greatly
facilitated coordination of the response operation (Rolan and Cameron, 1991).
Throughout the cleanup process, technologies for offshore recovery and shoreline cleanup
were chosen following the "general consensus" approach. Given the availability of
equipment and favorable weather conditions (light offshore winds and calm seas) a highly
successful mechanical recovery operation was immediately initiated. Plans for deploying
oil containment booms to protect sensitive wetlands areas within Anaheim Bay and
Newport Bay were quickly implemented. The issue of dispersant use was quickly resolved
with the consensus being that dispersants should not be used due to the availability of
mechanical cleanup alternatives, the proximity of shoreline ecosystems, and the absence of
any conclusive threat to specific wetland areas. Although the bulk of the spill would
remain offshore for several days due to favorable winds, shoreline cleanup resources were
also quickly mobilized.
These timely and decisive actions of the response participants were instrumental in predetermining the overall effectiveness of the response, and in instilling confidence in local
government and the general public. To reinforce this confidence, the Coast Guard and
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British Petroleum instituted a focused and coordinated public information program in the
fIrst few hours of the spill. The Coast Guard also insured that the local governments were
directly involved in the decision-making process by establishing response coordination
centers in Huntington Beach and Newport Beach. This media and government relations
program enhanced the consensus building process which facilitated effective management
of cleanup efforts and response termination.
On February 13, the winds shifted from offshore to onshore and substantial quantities of

oil came ashore along a 14 mile section of the Huntington BeachfNewport Beach area. In
planning the beach cleanup effort, every effort was made to balance the removal of the oil
with the environmental impact of the cleanup operation. The decision was quickly made to
limit removal operations on the sand beaches to labor intensive but environmentally benign
manual methods and exclude heavy equipment to minimize the removal of sand from the
beaches. Where beach rock and jetties were oiled, removal was generally restricted to cold
water washing, with hot water being employed only when environmental effects were not
an issue.
In approaching the "how clean is clean" issue, a two-step beach cleanup approval process
was adopted. A beach was deemed to be suffIciently cleaned when:
No hydrocarbon odor, visual evidence of oil, or "oily feel" existed on the
beach.
The average hydrocarbon level of the berm, low tide zone, and high tide
zone samples taken every 500 feet along the beach segment was less than
100 ppm (using the EPA 418.1 test method).
The fIrst of these criteria is consistent with the flIst test specifIed in the Coast Guard Marine
Safety Manual (USCG, 1995). The second was derived from a standard test normally
used to certify the soil in old oil fields to be clean enough for follow-on residential
development (Patrea, 1994). The two step shoreline cleanup decision process is depicted
in Figure 12.
The overall approach can be described as a "general consensus approach supported by
quantitative analytical data". Overall, the approach was effective in managing the level of
effort and resolving the "how clean is clean" issue. However, Card and Meehan (1991)
point out that the quantitative standard was dictated by the high public use of the beach, and
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the need to provide some further assurance to the public that the beaches were safe. For
beaches that are less heavily utilized, the quantitative analytical test would be unwarranted.
It should also be noted that the sampling strategy was somewhat arbitrary (500 feet), and
that the test was not originally designed for marine spill situations. However, as it was
accepted by the parties involved, it probably facilitated the decision to terminate cleanup by
reinforcing the conclusion with the local governments and the public that the beaches were
indeed safe for human recreational use.
In summary, the MN AMERlCAN TRADER spill response has been widely regarded as

one that was effectively and efficiently managed, and one of the more successful response
efforts on record. This success can be attributed to three important factors.
The first factor is the spill characteristics. The spill was of moderate size, confmed to a
limited area, and subject to favorable weather conditions allowing for an optimum
mechanical recovery effort offshore, and a straightforward cleanup effort on the beaches.
As the impacted shoreline was adjacent to an urban port area, the logistics of assembling
and deploying cleanup resources was greatly simplified. This is in contrast to the EXXON
VALDEZ spill which was an order of magnitude larger, hampered by adverse weather, and
which required cleanup operations in remote areas, greatly complicating logistics.
The second factor contributing to the success was the recent revision of the Area

Contingency Plan (which was prompted by EXXON VALDEZ), and a spill exercise which
had been completed just prior to the spill. This facilitated rapid mobilization of the
response management system based on the Incident Command System, and allowed for
general cooperation and consensus building throughout the response effort.
The third important factor was the timely and focused dissemination of information to
stakeholders, the press and the public. Briefings were routinely scheduled, and local
officials and resource trustees were directly involved in the decision process. Despite
negative public reaction over the fact that the spill had occurred, the public soon perceived
the subsequent response effort as being coordinated and effective.

45

The 1993 Tampa Bay Oil SpiIJ
The Tampa Bay oil spill of August 10, 1993 is noteworthy both in terms of its cause,
complexity and the organization of the shoreline cleanup effort that ensued. The spill began
with the collision of three vessels at the entrance to Tampa Bay channel including the bulk
phosphate carrier MfV BALSA 37, and two tug/barge combinations OCEAN 255 and B.
No. 155. The collision resulted in a spectacular explosion and fIre on the OCEAN 255
which required a complex and dangerous fire fIghting and salvage effort and resulted in a
32,000 gallon spill (762 barrels) of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel (Kichner, 1995). The
Barge B. No. 155 was holed causing a near instantaneous release of 330,000 gallons
(7857 barrels) of heavy No.6 oil. The MfV BALSA was also severely damaged and
intentionally grounded to avoid capsizing and sinking. Thus in the early hours of the spill,
the Coast Guard FOSC had many issues to contend with in addition to containing and
recovering spilled oil.
The oil discharge constituted a "significant spill" with the cleanup effort involving
protective booming, offshore recovery, shoreline and mangrove cleaning and wildlife
rescue operations. In the early stages of the response, protective booms were effectively
deployed to protect environmentally sensitive areas at Egmont and Mullet Keys. The bulk
of the oil was initially carried offshore by prevailing winds and currents which allowed an
intensive skimming operation and recovery of over half of the oil (Harbert, 1995).
On August IS, shifting winds drove the remaining oil ashore along a 14-mile stretch of
beaches from St Petersburg to North Redington Beach and into Boca Ciega Bay and the
Intercoastal Waterway. Eventually, 20 miles of shoreline, seawalls, docks and residential
canals were contaminated requiring an extensive shoreline cleanup effort Figure 13 shows
the general location and coastal area impacted by the spill. The shoreline cleanup effort was
unique in that it included recovering oil on the beaches as well as oil submerged in intertidal
areas, and clearly demonstrated an evolving approach to shoreline cleanup monitoring and
development of specifIc qualitative "how clean is clean" criteria.
As with EXXON VALDEZ, the strategic planning and monitoring of the shoreline cleanup
effort was delegated to a group of spill response specialists known simply as the "Technical
Committee". The group was composed of representatives from NOAA (Scientific Support
Coordinator and support staft), State of Florida (Department of Natural Resources,
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Division of Beaches and Shores), and the responsible party (Maritrans LP) carrying out the
cleanup. The Technical Committee proceeded with the complex task of planning,
implementing and monitoring shoreline cleanup following an organized sequence as
described by Owens et. al. (1995), and depicted in Figure 14. The sequence involved the
following key steps:
Form a team of experienced individuals with representation from
all affected stakeholders.
Conduct preliminary surveys to determine the overall extent of
contamination and the cleanup issues to be addressed.
Identify various options (technologies and methodologies) and
implementation strategies.
Conduct any necessary field tests to verify the effectiveness of potentially
viable technologies and methodologies, and detennine the potential for
adverse environmental effects.
Develop criteria on when and where technologies and methodologies should
be used, and to what degree they should be pursued (set "How Clean Is
Clean" criteria).
Monitor cleanup activities as they proceed.
Assess condition of beach to determine "how clean is clean". Terminate or
continue adapting techniques as required.
The Tampa Bay spill shoreline cleanup largely involved the removal of oil from sandy
beaches where the oil had been deposited and then buried under sand by subsequent
incoming tides. The primary issue faced by the Technical Committee was whether to use
environmentally intrusive mechanical methods (front-end loaders and graders) for
removing the oil layer or manual methods (workers with shovels). The mechanical option
provided for quick removal of the oil but also removal of large amounts of sand and
disruption of beach geomorphology. The manual option minimized this impact but
required more manpower and time. The Technical Committee decided that the mechanical
method would be employed for heavily oiled sections of beach, while the manual option
would be employed for lightly oiled sections, and polishing activities on heavily oiled
sections following mechanical removal. In adopting this approach, a balance was sought
between minimizing environmental impact to the beach, while restoring an important
recreational resource to service. There was some urgency involved in this as local officials
wanted access to the bathing beaches restored by the approaching Labor Day holiday.
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In resolving the "how clean is clean" issue, a three tiered visual inspection process was
followed using a defined spatial "sampling" scheme and somewhat subjective qualitative
criteria These criteria are shown in Table 2 and represent an attempt to make more generic
guidance (such as in the CG Marine Safety Manual) more tangible and scenario specific.
Perhaps more significantly they represent a benchmark for consensus building by the
Technical Committee which ultimately decided if the beaches were clean enough. This
approach, which can be described as a "general consensus with specific qualitative criteria"
provided for an effective cleanup effort and smooth termination of the shoreline cleanup
operations prior to the Labor day deadline.

MORRIS J. BERMAN Spill at San Juan
On January 7, 1994, the tank barge MORRIS J. BERMAN ran aground on a nearshore

reef 200 yards offshore of Punta Escambron in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Figure 15 shows
the general location and area impacted by the spill. The barge immediately began leaking
heavy No.6 fuel oil which impacted the adjacent shallow lagoons and shoreline. In all,
approximately 800,000 gallons (19,000 barrels) of No.6 were lost. The oil continued to
leak from the barge during the week following the grounding causing reoiling of the
beaches following initial removal and hampering the cleanup effort To alleviate this
problem, the barge was refloated on January 15, towed to a scuttling site 20 nautical miles
northeast of San Juan, and sunk (at "scuttling site" indicated in Figure 15).
Immediate countermeasures and cleanup offshore included lightering of the barge (prior to
the intentional sinking), and skimming operations. These measures resulted in the removal
of 17,700 barrels of oil from the water or leaking barge. Shoreline cleanup focused on
manual methods. Shoreline cleanup technology selection was once again made through the
general consensus of the major participants in consultation with key stakeholders. Surface
and buried oil was generally removed using shovels, rakes, and sifting screens to remove
oil from sand. Conveyor driven separators were used in some areas. Sand, rocks and
gravel were either washed with a chemical treating agent (Corexit 9580) and replaced, or
in some cases hauled away and disposed of. Care was taken to conduct cleanup operations
in a manner that would cause minimal damage to the environment Special care was taken
to protect turtle nesting areas, beach dunes, and historic structures and archeological sites
which had been contaminated by the oil. Inaccessible areas with high energy
environments were left for natural cleaning. All things considered, the cleanup effort was
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Table 2. How clean is clean procedures and criteria used for cleanup of
sandy beaches during the Tampa Bay oil spill of 1993.
Beaches are divided into segments corresponding to municipalities (North Reddington
Beach, Redington Beach, Madeira, Treasure Island, St. Petersburg, Egmont Key, Ft.
DeSoto Park (beach».
Once beach cleanup contractors determine that their efforts on a particular beach are
completed, a three tiered process goes into effect. First, a small technical group consisting
of appropriate representatives (Coast Guard, state, county, etc.) conducts two preliminary
checks for subsurface and surface oiL The third and final check includes appropriate local
officials who have authority to make fmal recommendations to the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator (FOSC). These recommendations will be presented to the FOSC who will
then make the fmal decision on whether the beach cleanup has been completed.
Additionally, the responsible party will need to perform routine maintenance on the beach
over the ensuing weeks if necessary (i.e. tar balls washing up on the shore, etc.)
1. Subsurface oil check
A. Red Zones: Areas of known subsurface oil (historical). A series of 3-5 pits (on
top of berm, halfway down the berm, and in the mid-intertidal) will be dug perpendicular to
the shoreline at regular intervals (50-100 ft.).
B. Yellow Zones: Areas where subsurface oil has not been previously reported, or
has been removed with no indication of additional oil burial. Pit intervals may be spaced to
300 ft. Pits are inspected for any layers of subsurface, black oil. Any areas needing
additional cleanup are marked and contractors notified.

2. Surface oil check
Once an area has passed the subsurface check, the technical group conducts a walk-through
for any visible black surface oil or large areas of heavy stain. Small quantities of tarballs in
the surf zone will not be flagged, since these will be picked up by the standby response
crew. Sand will be checked for smell or feel of oil.
Areas that have passes both subsurface and surface checks are ready for fmal inspection.
3. Final Recommendations
A group consisting of appropriate officials (including local officials) conducts a final walk
through the area Sporadic pits can be dug to check for subsurface oil, and visual checks
conducted for surface oil and oil smell, along with oily feel checks of the sand. After this
walk, officials will have the opportunity to make the final recommendation to the FOSC.
This will be an iterative process and at any point additional cleanup activities can be
conducted if deemed necessary.
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well-planned, skillfully implemented, and effectively managed to ensure optimum cleanup
in accordance with the ACP.
In addressing the "how clean is clean" question the POSC in San Juan adopted an approach
similar to that used in the Tampa Bay spill, that is "general consensus with specific
qualitative guidelines". In implementing the process, the contaminated shoreline area was
divided into 15 zones, with most of the zones being further subdivided into segments.
Each beach supervisor would determine when cleanup was judged to be complete
according to the guidelines that had been promulgated. He would then request inspection
by the Shoreline Assessment Team which would make the fmal cleanup termination
recommendation to the FOSe. The Shoreline Assessment Team was made up of both
Federal and Commonwealth representatives including the (Coast Guard, NOAA, Puerto
Rico Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and Puerto Rico Environmental Quality
Board (EQB)). The specific guidelines adopted are summarized in Table 3 (NOAA,
1993). Figure 16 shows the shoreline cleanup and "How clean is clean" decision-making
process for the BERMAN spill. Figure 17 shows the checkoff sheet used to support the
process.
In summary, the MORRIS 1. BERMAN spill involved adapting the shoreline cleanup
decision process that had proved successful at Tampa Bay. Specific qualitative guidelines,
particularly suited to the spill scenario and location, appear to have facilitated the "how
clean is clean" decision process in San Juan. Consensus was ultimately reached on all
segments, and the cleanup smoothly brought to closure.
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Table 3. How clean is clean criteria used in the MORRIS J. BERMAN
spill.
Sand Beaches
Surface Sediments - Must be free of visible oil, oily feel and the smell of oil. Tarballs
should be minimal and high recreational use beaches should be monitored for tarballs.
Sand replacement and sand washing should be completed for heavily oiled, very high use,
recreational beaches.
Buried Oil - Beaches should be sampled at regular intervals for buried oil layers; buried oil
layers should be removed. Sand that is merely stained may be left in place.
Beachrock
Areas of High Recreational Use - Heavily oiled natural bedrock areas should be cleaned
using shoreline cleaning agents and high pressurelhot water flushing (one treatment only).
Residual oil should left in place as the objective is not to remove all oil but to enhance
natural removal.
Areas with Limited Recreational Use or No Access - Remove gross accumulations of oil
from accessible sites, and leave remaining oil for natural removal. This was deemed
appropriate as most inaccessible areas were also high energy areas.
Rip Rap
High Recreational Use Areas - Heavily oiled rip rap should be cleaned using shoreline
cleaning agents and high pressure/hot water flushing (one treatment only). Residual oil
should left in place as the objective is not to remove all oil but to enhance natural removal.
Inaccessible, high energy areas that pose risks to workers should be left to natural
recovery.
Areas with Limited Recreational Use or No Access - Remove gross oil at accessible sites;
leave the rest to natural cleaning as sites are located in high energy settings.
Seawalls
High Recreational UselHigh Visibility Areas - Clean using hot-pressure washers to the
extent that they do not feel tacky when touched. Residual staining may remain.
Other Seawalls - Remove gross oil that continues to generate a sheen. Hot pressure wash
those seawalls that will further contaminate boats or are near staging areas. Residual
staining may remain.
Submerged Oil
Accumulations of submerged oil should be removed (oil is still liquid and can be
vacuumed), particularly in sheltered, shallow lagoons. Scattered accumulations in other
areas should be removed consistent with operation~ limitations. Oil should be recovered
until declining effectiveness renders further recovery impractical.
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7.0

OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS APPROACHES TO RESOLVING
THE "HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN" ISSUE

In reviewing the evolution of various approaches to the "how clean is clean" issue, several
observations can be made characterizing the utility and limits of each.
General Consensus Approach - This approach appears to be flexible and effective in a
majority of situations, and particularly in complex response efforts which involve a variety
of technologies, shoreline types, and conflicting opinions and agendas. It allows some
fonn of consensus to be reached even under difficult circumstances. Without some degree
of consensus, resolving the "how clean is clean" issue is impossible.
General Consensus Based on Specific Qualitative Criteria - This is an extension of the
general consensus approach which appears to be evolving as a standardized method based
on the major spills in Tampa Bay and San Juan. The "how clean is clean" guidelines are
tailored to a specific location and spill response scenario. As in the case of the MORRIS J.
BERMAN spill, they clearly reflect the concept that a point will be reached where further
cleanup will increase rather than prevent environmental damage, and recognize the value in
specific situations of choosing the natural recovery option.
Analytical Quantitative Awroach - This approach may be useful in certain situations, but
should be used with some caution, and only as a backup to a more flexible, qualitative
approach. Analytical tests should be specified according to an existing standard, and be
scientifically justified. They should be clearly linked to a particular environmental risk or
health hazard associated with the specific spill. In general, they will be most useful when
there is already general consensus and cooperation among the parties involved in making
the "how clean is clean" determination.
Net Environmental Benefit Analysis - This is a comprehensive, scientifically documented
procedure for determining if a cleanup technology is appropriate and how far it should be
carried. It is thorough but time consuming, and will only be applicable to certain longerterm cleanup projects such as the rock washer. However, there may be value in conducting
NEBA studies on generic technologies in generalized environments as part of the
contingency planning process, to allow refinement of the qualitative guidelines that can be
used during the actual response.
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8.0

DEVELOPING A STANDARD APPROACH AND PROVIDING
DECISION SUPPORT INFORMATION

In reviewing several spill response efforts, and particularly those during the 1993 Tampa
Bay and the MORRIS 1. BERMAN spill in San Juan, it is clear that a consistent approach
is evolving for effectively and efficiently managing shoreline cleanup and resolving the
"how clean is clean" issue. The purpose of this section is to propose a generalized model
for this process, describe how the model can be implemented during contingency planning
and response, and identify the necessary infonnation and computational tools required to
support the decision process. Fortunately, many of these information sources and tools
exist or are under development

Developing A Standard Strategic and Tactical Approach
A general model for effective and efficient management of response operations is shown in
Figure 18. The model shows two distinct phases to the spill response effort, a strategic
planning phase and tactical execution phase, similar to the process depicted in Figure 1.
During the strategic planning phase, various response options are screened to determine
which are appropriate to the spill scenario in question. Response options are chosen based
on the overall applicability of the technology, the resources available to make use of the
technology, and the environmental risk addressed by the technology.
Technology options considered will include mechanical recovery of the oil using booms
and skimmers, in-situ burning of the oil, application of dispersants at sea, and a range of
shoreline cleanup options for various shoreline types. Each option will be evaluated based
on the overall applicability to the scenario (e.g. mechanical recovery for small harbor spills
and heavier oils offshore, in-situ burning for large crude oil spills at sea, dispersant
application for small spills which threaten sensitive resources, and special mechanical
recovery techniques for oils that sink). Estimates are made of the equipment and personnel
required to implement the technologies. Significant environmental risks associated with
both the spill itself and the countenneasures are identified Regulations and policies that
constrain the use of a particular technology (such as exclusion zones for dispersant use or
in-situ burning) must also be considered.
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I'igure 18. Generalized strategic model for planning and managing oil spill
cleanup operations.
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As outlined in the National Contingency Plan, the groundwork for this strategic decision
making should be accomplished well in advance of the actual spill during the development
of the Area Contingency Plan (ACP). In this plan, anticipated spill scenarios for particular
ports and coastal areas are evaluated, environmental risks analyzed, and response options
developed. The result is a set of specific action plans that can be quickly implemented once
the spill occurs. The ACP process is accomplished by the Area Committee which include
representatives from the major participating agencies and organizations, and will foster
consensus building well in advance of the actual spill.
Once these strategic action plans have been formulated by the designated participants, they
should be communicated to the various stakeholders. Stakeholders should be informed of
the selected technology options, the rationale for choosing the option, the environmental
risks involved, and the expected level of success in terms of the percentage of oil that can
be reasonably treated or removed. The plans should be described in non-technical terms
that can be easily understood by the stakeholders, the press and the general public. These
descriptions should also be developed during the contingency planning process when a
consensus can be reached on expected results and criteria for success. This will prevent the
release of conflicting versions of response expectations during the actual response.
Once a spill occurs, the strategic options are reviewed, the action plan adjusted, and
response resources are deployed expeditiously. Initial information briefmgs are conducted
for stakeholders and the press. At this point, the response effort enters the tactical phase.
The results and impacts of cleanup operations are assessed based on the progress made
(barrels of oil recovered, dispersed or burned; sections of shoreline cleaned), the resources
expended and their cost, and the observed effects of the cleanup both positive and negative.
An overall assessment is made of the effectiveness and efficiency of operations based on
the readily available quantitative data on progress, cost and effects. If specific operations
(e.g. mechanical recovery, in-situ burning, shoreline cleaning) are judged to be effective
and efficient, they are continued If not, they are terminated ideally through the consensus
of key response agencies.
A similar process is followed in addressing the specific problems and issues in shoreline
cleanup. As shown in Figure 19, the first step in the process is to assemble the Shoreline
Cleanup Assessment Team (SCA1). The team conducts a preliminary shoreline survey to
determine the degree of oiling, sediment penetration, condition of the oil, and unique
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Figure 19. Generalized tactical model for planning and managing shoreline
cleanup and resolving the "how clean is clean II (HCIC) issue.
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conditions that will aid or constrain cleanup options. The team will then review data from
the Area Contingency Plan and other readily available sources of information on the
suitability of specific cleanup technologies for specific shoreline types, and the availability
of resources to implement these technologies. Environmental sensitivity and shoreline
cleanup effectiveness data will be accessed to determine the expected results and impacts of
these technologies. Ideally these data will already be compiled for each shoreline segment.
If deemed appropriate, small scale tests will be conducted with various techniques to
supplement these data and refine the strategic plan.
Once the plan is agreed to by the response participants, operations are initiated and the
results monitored and evaluated based on results (e.g. linear kilometer or square meter of
shoreline treated, percentage of oil removed), quantity and cost of resources expended, and
observed and expected environmental effects. As it becomes clear that results are
deminishing with the effort expended on a particular section of shoreline, a "how clean is
clean" determination is made based on specific qualitative criteria. Operations on a specific
segment are then continued or terminated as appropriate.
In shoreline cleaning in particular, pre-planning is essential due to the complexity of the
problem and the often differing views on which techniques may be best suited to a specific
shoreline segment and spill scenario. By pre-planning for various shoreline types and
segments, sufficient technical information can be gathered in advance, and a consensus
action plan formulated by the Area Committee. The shoreline cleanup strategy should also
be communicated to affected stakeholders (e.g. property owners and resource trustees).
Ideally conflicts can be resolved prior to the spill, and a consensus reached on the expected
outcome.
Pre-spill planning is also necessary in addressing the "how clean is clean" issue which
generally focuses on the shoreline cleanup operation. Before cleanup operations are
initiated, an overall strategy for addressing the HCIC issue is formulated and qualitative
guidelines developed as OCClllTed in the 1993 Tampa Bay Spill and the MORRIS J.
BERMAN spill. To the extent possible, these region specific guidelines should be
developed during the contingency planning process, and incorporated as part of the Fish
and Wildlife and Sensitive Environments Plan Annex of the Area Contingency Plan. Each
of the predominant shoreline types within the region should be addressed.
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Providing Information to Support the Decision Process
An overall approach to effectively and efficiently managing oil spill cleanup operations has
been outlined above. This approach has evolved during several major spill response efforts
in recent years. As discussed briefly above, implementation of this approach requires
information to support both the strategic planning process which begins in the development
of the Area Contingency Plan, and the tactical implementation of the plan.
The strategic planning process requires information in three important areas:
The expected performance of various countermeasures and cleanup
techniques, equipment and treating agents to remove or mitigate the impact
of oil on the surface of the water and on shorelines.
The environmental effects associated with various countermeasures and
cleanup actions.
The availability of equipment, treating agents, deployment resources, and
personnel to implement the technologies within the window of opportunity
for effectiveness.
Information in the first area is readily available. The general applicability of cleanup
techniques for on-water removal and treatment has been widely documented. General
guidelines on the resource requirements, performance, procedures and windows of
opportunity have been provided in various reports (Allen, 1988; Nordvik, Simmons and
Champ, 1995) and in various spill response manuals (Exxon, 1992; NOAA, 1994).
The characteristics of various pieces of equipment (e.g. booms, skimmers, pumps, storage
devices, dispersant applicators) and products (e.g. sorbants, dispersants, cleaning agents)
are compiled in the World Catalog of Oil Spill Cleanup (Schulze, 1993) which exists in
both hard copy and computer database form. Information on the effectiveness and toxicity
of dispersants and other chemical treating agents is compiled in the National Contingency
Plan Product Schedule. The NCP specifies that treating agents must be tested and listed in
this Product Schedule to be used on spills in U.S. waters (EPA, 1994). Additional
information on dispersants and sorbants has been compiled in computer databases
developed by the USCG and NOAA. Many of the comprehensive oil spill response
decision support systems now being developed contain a wealth of information on
techniques, equipment and products to facilitate strategic planning (lshiki, 1995; Mark,
1995).
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In the second area, generic information on the environmental effects of various on-water
countermeasures and cleanup techniques is also available. Toxicity data for approved oil
spill treating agents are provided by the NCP Product Schedule. The potential effects of insitu burning on the environment and human health have been rigorously investigated since
the EXXON VALDEZ spill. These research efforts are well-documented in the literature
(NIST, 1994). Computer models are being developed to predict the smoke plume
trajectory associated with in-situ burning operations and the distribution of contaminants.
Information on the appropriateness and environmental effects of shoreline cleanup
techniques is available in several shoreline cleanup manuals, which provide generic
guidelines on response strategies based on shoreline type, type of oil, and degree of oiling.
These manuals include the NOAA Shoreline Cleanup Manuals for temperate and tropical
waters (NOAA 1992a and 1993), the American Petroleum Institute Shoreline Cleanup
Manuals (API 1985 and APIINOAA 1995), and the Environment Canada Shoreline
Cleanup Manual (Owens, 1995a). General guidelines for developing strategies are
provided in a concise tabular format in the API and Environment Canada Manuals as
shown in Figures 20 and 21. More specific net environmental benefit discussions are
provided in the NOAA manuals for temperate and tropical regions.
In meeting requirements in the third area, data on the availability of equipment, materials
and deployment platforms are generally compiled at the local level as part of he Area
Contingency Plan. Infonnation on national assets to support response to catastrophic spills
is compiled in the Response Resources Inventory maintained by the Coast Guard's
National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC, 1995).
In summary, much of the infonnation required for spill response strategic planning as
outlined in the upper portions of Figures 18 and 19 is readily available. For certain
techniques, including dispersant application and in-situ burning, this information is being
compiled in computer databases with supporting analytical tools to allow responders to
develop preliminary strategic options, and rapidly refine the response strategy once the
specifics of an actual spill are known (Allen and Dale, 1995; Ishiki and Chan, 1995).
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To support the tactical monitoring and evaluation of operations as the response proceeds,
additional information is required in real time. This includes information on:

Progress made in terms of volume of oil treated or recovered, and length or
area of shoreline cleaned.
Resources used and ideally the cost of cleanup operations (in terms of total
cost and unit cost).
The observed effects of the cleanup effort both positive and negative.
In recording progress, data on the volume of oil treated or recovered are routinely collected
during spill response operations and compiled on a daily basis. Data on shoreline cleanup
are also routinely collected and can be compiled and plotted as was done during the
EXXON VALDEZ spill. Early in the spill response, an effective computerized progress
tracking tool was developed called CAMEO (Computer Aided Management of Emergency
Operations) VALDF.Z (Haas, 1991). This system recorded progress in miles of shoreline
cleaned, and compared progress to cleanup projections by the FOSC and Exxon as shown
in Figure 22. Progress was also measured in units called "Clydes" (Cleanup Yield During
Exxon Spill) which were calculated to quantitatively describe level of effort (Olsen, 1989).
This calculation integrated the length and width of shoreline cleaned with the degree of
oiling and relative difficulty of cleaning a particular section of shoreline (a function of
shoreline type, oil penetration and quantity of debris). CAMEO VALDEZ proved highly
useful in allowing responders to track progress on the enormous and complex cleanup
effort. The system has been adapted and used in several other major spins. Similar
systems are being incorporated into spill response DSS.
Tracking the resources expended and actual cost of response operations is somewhat more
challenging as it involves more elaborate real-time accounting. However, in response to
the escalating costs of spill cleanup, On-Scene Coordinators and responsible parties are
often contracting spill response management consultants to provide this support (Evans,
1994; Dufour, 1995). This accounting service keeps track of the resources expended by
logging cleanup personnel and equipment on and off the cleanup site using an electronic bar
code system. Resources expended can then be converted to costs knowing labor rates and
equipment rental rates. This is now automatically accomplished in a DSS developed by
Magnavox whereby total cost and daily costs are automatically computed and recorded
(Mark, 1994; White, 1995). Such data can be easily fed into computer tracking tools such
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as CAMEO VALDEZ, so that cost and progress can be displayed together as depicted in
Figure 22. It is also possible to construct simple models which will project resource levels
and cleanup costs based on the current resources employed and current costs, and the
amount of cleanup work remaining.
Determining the positive and negative effects of the cleanup effort in real-time is more
challenging still. As mentioned above, spill cleanup manuals and databases provide general
guidance on cleanup technology performance and environmental effects, but cleanup impact
often depends on the specific spill scenario and characteristics of the site itself. These
characteristics include the overall environmental sensitivity, as well as the presence of
important economic, recreational, and historic & archaeological resources. In addition,
these effects can be subtle at first, with the full impact not evident until long after the
response effort has been completed.
Since EXXON VALDEZ, there has been renewed emphasis on studying the effects of both
the oil and the countermeasures and cleanup techniques employed. This includes shortterm effects particularly for on-water techniques such as dispersant application and in-situ
burning and shoreline oil removal techniques. Specific monitoring protocols are being
developed for judging the effectiveness of these techniques. Long-term effects are also
being monitored more closely, particularly for shoreline cleanup, and refmed monitoring
protocols are being developed. This includes the designation of set-aside beaches for
significant spills whereby small segments of beach are deliberately not cleaned to serve as a
baseline for judging the positive and negative benefits of those that are cleaned. In some
cases, segments of oil beaches are being used as experiment sites for longer-tenn testing of
cleaning techniques such as pressure washing, cleaning with surfactants, and
bioremediation.
The results of these field studies, and those from laboratory scale experiments, are being
recorded in an impressive collection of papers and reports on the subject However, this
literature cannot be quickly accessed to provide specific facts relevant to a specific scenario
during a spill response operation, and is cumbersome even for contingency planning
purposes. To overcome this, efforts are underway to compile this scientific knowledge
into computerized "knowledge bases" which can rapidly retrieve the information relevant to
a specific scenario and site, and present it in a format to facilitate decision-making.
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For instance, a sophisticated DSS tool for shoreline cleanup, called SHORECLEAN, has
been developed to predict the environmental impact of oil on shorelines based on type of
shoreline, type of oil, oil penetration and area covered (Lamarche et al., 1995). Output
data includes oil persistence and shoreline recovery times, and suggested cleanup
techniques. SHORECLEAN is based on the knowledge contained in the various shoreline
cleanup manuals, the results of laboratory studies, and the results of field observations.
The current version focuses on shorelines in temperate climates, versions for Arctic and
tropical shorelines are planned.
One area where information is somewhat lacking is in the performance of specific shoreline
cleanup techniques and their efficiency. Specifically, data should be compiled on the
expected percentage of oil removed under various oiling conditions, using various
techniques. Data on the associated level of effort and unit cost would also be very useful in
selecting specific techniques for sections of shoreline. Unfortunately, compiling such a
performance and efficiency database requires gathering and analyzing the results and cost
data from actual spills. Although some data is being gathered at certain spills, there is no
formalized protocol and database system for accomplishing this at present.
Above all, final judgment of the effectiveness of various cleanup techniques must be made
during the response effort by teams of experts. It is impossible to fully forecast in advance
the results and impact of a particular technique on a specific shoreline that has been oiled.
Variables such as oil type, temperature, wave conditions, and beach accessibility all come
into play. In the Tampa Bay Spill and the MORRIS J. BERMAN spill, cleanup techniques
were tested on small representative sites to provide preliminary indication of positive and
negative effects. However, each section of shoreline is unique, and environmental and
oiling conditions can change in the course of a response effort. This requires ongoing
monitoring and assessment of cleanup effectiveness.
A procedure which may facilitate the selection of cleanup techniques and monitoring of
progress, and making the "how clean is clean" determination is development of site specific
templates for the various shoreline types for incorporation in the Area Contingency Plan.
In this process, the various shoreline types in a given area would be determined (e.g. sandy
recreational beaches, marsh areas, tidal flats, cobble beaches). For each shoreline type, a
shoreline cleanup template would be developed using data from existing cleanup manuals,
environmental sensitivity maps, output from databases and models such as
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SHORECLEAN, and local knowledge from spill responders and the scientific community.
Each template would include a general description of the shoreline type in the specific area,
a description of the projected effectiveness of various cleanup techniques, some estimate of
the level of effort and cost associated with these techniques, and "preliminary" criteria for
determining "how clean is clean".
These templates would be prepared by potential spill responders within the local area, and
ideally by those individuals who would comprise the "experts" on the Shoreline Cleanup
Assessment Teams (SCATS). The templates would be reviewed by the Area Committees
to obtain consensus on the overall approach. A sample template showing general structure
and format is shown in Table 4. This sample was prepared using shoreline data on an
actual segment oiled during the MORRIS J. BERMAN spill.
Each segment of shoreline within the area would be referenced to one of these templates.
This could be easily accomplished within the framework of existing computer DSS which
allow access to both text database information and GIS type maps within the same system.
Instituting such a procedure would have two benefits. First it would insure that the
necessary data for planning, implementing and monitoring shoreline cleanup is available
and pre-screened such that decision makers and stakeholders are all working from a
common reference point. Second, it would facilitate the consensus building process during
a spill by beginning this process during the development of the Area Contingency Plan,
when decisions can be made without the pressures and agendas that often arise during an
actual response.
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Table 4. Sample shoreline cleanup planning summary which could be
included in Area Contingency Plans.

No: 3D .

Segment Name:

Puerta de Tierra Beach

Location Description: Segment extends from the ruins in front of the National Guard
BUilding to the seawall at the Naval Reserve Officers Club. Beach Is easily accessible via
secondary roads In the area. Beach Is accessible by small boat from seaward. Private residences
and recreational facilities are located along the entire length of this segment.
Beach Type: Sandy beach with coarse-grained sand

Environmental Value
No sensitive environmental
resources on beach.
No sensitive resources
directly offshore.

Cultural Value
Historic ruins near
National Guard Bldg.
Do not anempt to clean
without consultation

Economic Value
Moderate ecreatlonal use.
011 removal of 90% or
greater Is desired.

CLEANUP TECHNIQUE
Oiling with Light Fuel Oils
Allow natural cleaning by wave action.
Tilling of sand near surf zone will expedite
cleaning. Collect oil with sorbants In surf.
OIling with Llght/Med Crude
Flushing with cold or hot water.
Collect 011 at surf line with sorbants.
Manual excavation where 011 has enetrated.
Oiling with Heavy 'Crude/Fuel 011
Requires excavation using heavy equipment.
Manual excavation for shallow penetration.'
Wash or replace heavily contaminated sand.

90

• 100%

Light

Low

90 • 95%

Moderate

Moderate

90 • laO %

Moderate

Very High

How Clean Is Clean Criteria:
Surface Sediments • Must be free of visible oil, oily feel, and smell of 011. Tarballs should
be minimal, monitoring lor tarballs should continue. As beach has moderate to heavy
recreational use, sand replacement is required.
Burled 011· Beach must be sampled at regular Intervals lor burled oU layers: burled 011
Should be removed. Sand that Is merely stained may be left in place.
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9.0

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In reviewing several oil spill response efforts, beginning with the EXXON VALDEZ spill
in March 1989, it is clear that responders are becoming more aware of effectiveness and
efficiency in managing oil spill response operations. Better response management is being
driven by government and public concern for the damage oil spills cause to the
environment, and the escalating cleanup costs, which must be borne by government,
industry, and ultimately the general public. Tenninating oil spill cleanup at the appropriate
time to maximize net environmental benefit and control costs is becoming more important,
such that the "how clean is clean" issue is being addressed in the literature, and in oil spill
response training curricula
Recent experience shows that spill responders will adopt different approaches in selecting
cleanup techniques, determining appropriate level of effort, and resolving the "how clean is
clean" issue. All three decision processes are necessary to ensure effectiveness and
efficiency. In the previous discussion, four specific approaches have been identified:
General Consensus Approach,
General Consensus Based on Specific Qualitative Criteria,
Analytical Quantitative Criteria, and
Net Environmental Benefit Analysis.
Each approach has proved effective in a specific spill scenario. The approach that is
evolving as generally accepted practice is the General Consensus Based on Specific
Qualitative Criteria as demonstrated during the 1993 Tampa Bay spill and the MORRIS J.
BERMAN spill. This approach appears to provide a well-defined decision-making process
which can be adapted to the specific circumstances of a spill. The approach can be modeled
as shown in Figures 18 and 19 to provide guidance in developing strategic and tactical
plans for future response efforts.
Reviewing current doctrine and practice in recent major spills indicates that four elements
are critical in making the decision process effective. First, there must be consensus on the
strategic and tactical plan for dealing with a specific spill among both response participants
and stakeholders. This consensus must begin in the contingency planning phase and be
cultivated throughout the response effort.
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Secondly, the process must be flexible to adapt to changing circumstances and agendas. In
some cases, it may be necessary to adopt one of the other three approaches. For instance,
the quantitative analytical criteria were used during the AMERICAN TRADER spill to meet
the expectations of stakeholders and preserve consensus. In other cases, it may be
impossible to assign specific qualitative criteria for determining "how clean is clean" such
that the decision must be made on the "best judgment" of the experts on-scene. For longer
term cleanup efforts involving complex technologies, a formal net environmental benefit

analysis may be required. Responders should be aware of all of these approaches, and be
prepared to combine them or adapt them as the spill scenario dictates.
The third critical element is accurate and accessible information on anticipated and actual
results of a cleanup effort (e.g. percentage of oil removed, length or area of shoreline
cleaned), infonnation on the environmental impacts of both the oil itself and the cleanup
techniques, and quantitative data on anticipated resource requirements and resources
expended and their cost. Recording results is a straightforward process during the spill,
and a substantial amount of data on environmental impacts has become available in recent
years. The most critical information gap is the lack of data on perfonnance, resource
requirements, and cost of specific cleanup techniques under specific circumstances. This
last infonnation category is particularly important in ensuring cleanup efficiency.
The fourth critical element is the confidence and support of the public. A cleanup effort can
never be considered successful if the media, interested parties and general public perceive it
as being uncoordinated and ineffective. If this occurs, they can be expected to exert
pressure through government agencies and elected officials often directed toward specific
agendas. This will complicate decisions on choosing effective and efficient techniques,
detennining appropriate level of effort, and resolving the "how clean is clean" issue to
smoothly terminate cleanup operations.
In ensuring that these four critical elements are met during a spill, three specific actions are
recommended. First, managing for effectiveness and efficiency, and resolving the "how
clean is clean" issue should be specifically addressed in developing the Area Contingency
Plans. Necessary information to support the decision process can be compiled in advance
as portrayed in Figure 4. In addition, the decision-making process for addressing these
issues should be practiced in spill response exercises. In the past, such exercises have
focused exclusively on initial notification and mobilization of the response organization and
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resources, with little emphasis on the longer term management issues. Addressing these
issues in advance will set the stage for consensus building and flexibility during an actual
spill.
Secondly, efforts in compiling data on anticipated results and environmental impacts of
various cleanup techniques should continue. In addition, special emphasis should be
placed on establishing a "knowledge base" of expected performance vs. expected resource
requirements and cost for specific techniques under various circumstances. Data should be
recorded and analyzed, particularly for major spills, in the same manner as the
environmental impact data. Protocols and action plans for accomplishing this should be
developed and become part of the spill response process.
Finally, an effort should be made to inform the public of the techniques which will be used,
expected results, and criteria for success during a spill response operation. This public
outreach plan should be included in the ACPs, and public education material prepared in
advance. Mechanisms for obtaining feedback and gauging public reaction should also be
established in advance, and implemented immediately once a spill occurs to deal with
"expectation management" issues that arise. This will ensure that the public is not misled
by the media or special interest groups in perceiving that a response effort, that is wellexecuted and successful within the limits of technology and resources, is a failure.
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